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I  INTRODUCTION
The editor of the American Political Science Review, the most prestigious and impor-
tant political science journal, introduced Jon Elster’s review of the book Analytic
Narratives with a note of enthusiasm about the dissemination of the rational choice
approach in political science:
The rational choice revolution in political science began in American politics in 
the 1970s, first influenced international relations in the 1980s, and made its way 
to comparative politics during the 1990s. As it moved beyond its base in American
politics, rational choice theory confronted comparative and historical questions 
of regime transition, social conflict, democratic stability, economic development,
and international governance (Vol 94(3), September 2000).
In this paper, I critically review part of this history. I discuss neo-institutional-
ism since it was through neo-institutionalism that rational choice established itself
in American politics. Originally, the approach dominated the Legislative Studies
area. From there it made its way to comparative politics. My discussion concen-
trates in these two sub fields: American politics and comparative politics. (For
comparativists, international relations can be ignored). In a sense, and this is one
of the points I want to make in this paper, the comparative field has been strongly
influenced by the Legislative Studies approach. The consequence is that the com-
parative field is not prepared to discuss State reform. Ironically, as regulatory
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agencies made their way into Latin America, comparativists were not prepared to
discuss their impact.
Practitioners of comparative rational choice neo-institutionalism seem to be
proud with their achievements.They are prepared to move on, to conquer new sub-
jects. For instance, one reads in the introduction Haggard and McCubbins (2001 1)
wrote for a recently edited volume 
A generation of work has shown that institutions affect various political outcomes.
For example, numerous scholars have shown that electoral systems shape the behavior
of parties, candidates, and voters. Other scholars have demonstrated that different
constitutional structures, such as presidential or parliamentary systems, affect regime
stability, accountability, responsiveness, and democratic durability.
I am not so sure that what was supposed to have been shown or demonstrated
has really been done.There is no doubt that the variables cited —electoral laws and
the form of government—have been the working horses of the neo-institutionalist
comparative field. However—and this is a point want to make—substantive find-
ings have not been established on solid grounds.This paper main objective is to sub-
stantiate this assertion. The demonstration asks for three sections, followed by the
concluding remarks.
The second section is dedicated to a brief incursion on methods. My objective
is to show that what is proudly taken as the founding stone of the movement, the
proof that institutions induce stability on collective choice, is not such a big achieve-
ment. The problem the 1979 celebrated Shepsle paper solves is, at most, an inter-
esting theoretical question. It makes sense in one tradition of though: the so-called
social choice approach. This approach precedes the advent of noncooperative game
theory as the standard formal modeling technique. In the noncooperative approach,
though, the question that obsessed scholars in the early seventies–why so much sta-
bility when the theory predicts instability— vanishes. Hence, one cannot say that
institutions matter because they induce stability.This is not enough. One needs a lot
more. One needs to establish that different outcomes follow from different institu-
tional arrangements. This, I argue, is a much more difficult task.
The third section is dedicated to the reconstruction of the core of the rational
choice institutionalism applied to American Politics. I present a very simple review.
I do not intend to present an original reconstruction. Quite the opposite. I want to
present a non sophisticated review because I believe that it is this non sophisticated
view that made its way into comparative politics. True, I construct a sort of a straw
man argument, but my point is that it is this straw man that has traveled abroad. At
the end of this section I present a summary of the assumptions and premises that
“invaded” the comparative field.
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The fourth section is dedicated to a brief discussion of the effects –or the alleged
effects—of the forms of government over public policy. I take this debate because
of its importance for the field. Moreover, I use this discussion to illustrate some of
the findings of the previous section. My conclusion is that it may well be the case
that parliamentarism outperforms presidentialism.Yet, so far, we do not know why.
The fifth section is dedicated to the discussion of presidentialism and bureaucrat-
ic agencies. In reality, I have little original material to present in this section. I have
to confess that time constraints forced me to conclude the paper before I could real-
ly finish it off.The paper is a work in progress. I just present an outline of what should
be an independent section dealing with presidential power and bureaucratic agencies.
I intend to develop this section to include an empirical analysis of some aspects of the
Brazilian state reform.The definitive version of the paper will have a discussion of the
independent agencies created during Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s administration.
Concluding remarks close the paper.
II  METHODS AND SOME PRELIMINARY COMMENTS
To start with, one needs a definition of institutionalism. Diermeier and Krehbiel
(2002 4) parsimonious definition is a could place to start:
The method in this kind of research consists of analysis in which institutional features
are taken as exogenous and behavioral postulates are fixed, and then compares
equilibria that are generated under different institutional arrangements.
The definition is simple and clear. It is a useful point of departure to avoid an
infinite regress. If institutions are taken as exogenous, then one does not need to
explain its emergence. One might do it, but it is not necessary. For the authors, if
one wants to explain the emergence of a given institution, then one need to step
back and start from a given set of institutions to derive the emergence of “the sec-
ond order institutions” of interest. Obviously, behavioral postulates should be kept
constant. As the authors dub it: this a Russian doll approach.
Although simple, this definition leaves on the side the questions usually associat-
ed with the onset of the movement, the Arrow’s impossibility and McKelvey’s chaos
theorems.The problem is not to explain why the choices collectivities make are sta-
ble. One does not need to reason from the state of nature. In fact, if considered seri-
ously, the world imagined by Arrow and McKelvey is not really a non-institutional
one. In both cases, it is the specific institutional set up, the fact that one can always
introduce an alternative to be voted against the status quo, that generates instability.
The Structure Induced Equilibrium (SIE) tradition emerged from social choice
theory inheriting its methods and research agenda.The research agenda was motivated
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by what leading institutionalists have tended to refer as “the spell of Arrow and
McKelvey”, meaning the lack of majority voting equilibrium in multi-dimensional
settings.The equilibrium concept used was the core: a point that once chosen could
not be defeated by majority vote. However, this tradition did not rely on a clearly
established behavioral postulate. The properties of the core were the object of the
inquiry. Why would that point be the one chosen was not part of the inquiry. For
instance, the McKelvey result relies heavily on myopic behavior.
Austen-Smith and Banks (1998) refer to such approach as the “preference aggrega-
tion approach”. One just aggregates preferences under different rules and compares
results. What is missing, as noted by Austen-Smith and Banks (1998 261), is the con-
nection between preferences and actions.To return to McKelvey’s result: the power of
the agenda setter to move the collective choice through the whole space depends on a
series of binary preference relations. In the usual textbook example of this theorem, all
but the agenda setter end up worse off at the end of the sequence of votes. In the text-
book example, players would be led to that Pareto inferior outcome through a series of
cleverly chosen sequence of choices, as if they were actually voting. But, the proof of
the theorem does not rely on actual voting. No one votes.Actually, no one does a thing.
It is only a possibility.That may happen. Is it likely? The answer for the scholar trained
in the non cooperative approach is no, this will not happen.The same holds for Arrow.
Hence, the two theorems do not have an empirical content.They cannot be read
as predicting this or that will happen. The point is, to return to Diermeier and
Krehbiel, there is no behavioral assumption to link preferences and actions.
The solution proposed by Shepsle (1977) to the so-called chaos problem is not
difficult to understand. The key operation is the partitioning of the “multidimen-
sional choice space into subsets of single issues that are voted on one at time”. In so
doing, the problem posed by the multidimensionality reduces to a series of choices
in a one dimensional space. Since for the one dimensional case, provided that some
conditions hold1, one can apply Black’s median voter theorem, the partitioning of
the space is an essential step for the solution.The second part of the solution is also
obtained by a crucial assumption, namely, the separability of the issues. That is, the
decisions in one issue (one dimension) do not affect and/or are related to the ones
taken in another issue (dimension). Diermeier and Krehbiel (2002 16) note:
The key methodological idea of SIE theory thus consists of transforming a social
choice problem in which the core does not exist (multi-dimensional choice spaces)
into a more structured problem in which the core does exist. Note, however that such
strategy maintains the core as the equilibrium concept.
The solution Shepsle proposes has a correspondence with real world institu-
tions. The partition of the choice space corresponds to the way the American
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Congress organizes its decision-making process via a committee system. But, as a
social choice model, the proof says nothing about the working of the Congress.
Shepsle proves the existence of the equilibrium.The model doesn’t say a word about
how the identified point will be reached in the real world situation. There is no
action. No one chooses or votes anything. So institutions here matter but they mat-
ter in a very specific way. All they do is to aggregate preferences in a straightforward
way. Descriptive and empirical analysis, to be discussed in the next section, is not
directly related to the proof.
The SIE approach has its roots on social choice and cooperative game theory. For
two decades or so, noncooperative game theory has been the dominant approach in
the field. The superiority of the latter, according to Diremeier and Krehbiel, stems
from its equilibrium concept (Nash equilibrium) and its behavioral postulate (individ-
uals always choose their best-response strategies). For the argument put forth in this
paper, two consequences of the noncooperative approach deserve special mention.
First, as Austen-Smith and Banks note (1998 274), the cooperative and the non-
cooperative approaches have opposite consequences. While the problem with the
social choice approach was the lack of a core, for the noncooperative game theoret-
ic approach the problem is opposite: too many equilibrium. Hence, “in this respect
the concept of Nash equilibrium is too weak; it places few restrictions in what out-
comes might be observed”.
Second and to make things even worse, results are sensitive to the specific
aspects of the game. Diermeier and Krehbiel (2002 19) take this feature as positive:
The qualitative features of the Nash equilibria are highly sensitive to the precise
details of the game forms. From the very beginning this fact precludes any notion 
of an ‘institution-free’ theory. Rather, the potential fruitfulness of the game-theoretic
approach stems from the simple fact that it explicitly models some features of
political institutions, and therefore, highlights how and why institutions matter 
However, as Kreps (1992 94) noted, the dependence on the model specification
cuts both ways.True, one may be able to compare different results as one varies the
institutional set up. But it also means that game theory “requires models of compet-
itive interaction that are very exact and precise as to the strategies available to the
players”. Some interactions may not provide such clarity. Besides, the way the mod-
eler conceives the options available to the actors may drive the results. Hence, pre-
dictions depend heavily on the way the modeler translates the real world situation
into a game form.
Hence, the apparently simple approach proposed by Diermeier and Krehbiel
raises a series of problems for neo-institutionalism understood as a method. Can
such an apparent parsimonious method provide us with clear-cut answers? Will the
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analysis provide the analyst with a restrict set of meaningful outcomes to compare?
Will the political process generate different outcomes as institutions differ? Will the
results depend on the way the model restrict the actors’ options? 
All things considered, what comparativists take as the great achievement of neo-
institutionalism —the 1979 Shepsle proof that institutions induce equilibrium—-is
not such a big achievement. It cannot be taken as the founding stone of institution-
alism. The field research agenda cannot be defined by the search of equilibrium or
stability. The real problem with institutional analysis is quite the opposite. To quote
Kreps (1992 95): one has “too many equilibria and no way to choose” among them2.
III  AMERICAN POLITICS: LEGISLATIVE STUDIES AND THE DISTRIBUTIVE APPROACH
Rational choice took over the American politics field carrying the neo institutional-
ism flag. As far as policy predictions were the concern, the claim that institutions
matter had a clear meaning. The democratic process leads to distributive policies.
Costs are dispersed and benefits are concentrated. Hence, from the substantive
point of view, the first vintage of American politics of neo institutionalism is associ-
ated with the distributive approach and its application to the study of legislatures.
At first sight, the distributive approach to congressional politics seemed to ful-
fill the promises of neo institutionalism: one could predict outcomes from assump-
tions about individual behavior and a precisely defined institutional set up.
Fiorina and Noll (1978 256) establish in a comprehensive and direct way the
point of departure of this type of analysis:
We assume that in choosing among alternative political actions, voters, bureaucrats,
and politicians pursue their self-interests. For voters, this means casting votes in a
manner that maximizes expected utility, given the platforms of competing candidates.
For bureaucrats, this means maximizing some measure of the size of bureaucracy.
For politicians, this means maximizing the probability of election.
As Shepsle and Weingast (1984 345) explain, for members of Congress, the
reelection goal translate into a specific strategy:
Members of Congress, at least since the turn of the century, have been motivated by
two strong desires: to secure reelection by serving their constituents and to develop 
a personal power base in Congress. That is the system. Moreover, to strengthen their
power bases and to provide for constituents, members have, with considerable
success, altered the very ways Congress conduct business. In so doing, they have
produced a policymaking machinery that often serves more general public purposes
only as an incidental by-product of these political objectives.
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Members of Congress use their mandates to pursue their objectives. As a mem-
ber of Congress, representatives may design policies that help themselves to obtain
their objectives.This is the secret. It explains why representatives have been so suc-
cessful in the electoral arena. It has been accepted as an uncontroversial fact that
reelection rates are very high in the US Congress. An incumbent defeat is a rare
event. Party swings and presidential coattails also lost their importance. The
Representative, no matter his or her party, is alone, is responsible for his or her elec-
toral fate. It all depends from his or her capacity to use the mandate to develop a
personal electoral basis.
The description of the institutional set up that favors the attainment of this
objective is well known. The Legislative decision making process is organized
around the committee system. Committees have well defined policy jurisdictions
over policy areas (say, agriculture, industry etc). Bills are reported to one and only
one committee that has the monopoly over the legislative initiatives in its jurisdic-
tion. Hence, the status quo in a given area cannot be changed without the initiative
of the committee.
Representatives choose the committees they want to join without any control
from the parties or the leaders.They self-select themselves into the committees that
have some say on what matters for their district. That is to say, electoral considera-
tions drive the distribution of representatives through the different committees. It
follows that committees are composed by “preference outliers”. That is to say, the
preferences of the committee members on the issues that are under its jurisdiction
are more extremist than the ones of the floor. That amounts to say that committee
members will favor an activist role of the state in the area under its jurisdiction. At
least, a much more activist state than the median floor representative would want.
To sum up, this is a model in which minorities rule.
Committees (and the sub-committees, in some accounts) are the key actors to
define the outcomes of the decision-making process. Their members’ interest
define the policy congress adopt. In this set up, committees are the real centers of
power. The match of the socio-economic characteristics of the district with the
committee jurisdiction plays a central role in the argument. As Shepsle and
Weingast (1984: 350) put it:
Policies, as a consequence, are victimized by two territorial imperatives emanating from
the legislative branch – geography and jurisdiction, constituencies and committees –
which help explain the past decade’s growth in federal budgetary commitments.
In other words: programs and policies will be tailored to attend the interests
of those seating in the committees (or sub-committees). Given the self-selection
appointment norm, these members are the ones with high stakes on the areas
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under their committee jurisdiction. The committee controls the policies that mat-
ter for the district.
Although, committees are not representative of the floor, the floor will approve
policies the bills the committees report.Why and how they do so, it is not clear. At
least, there is no institutional foundation for such voting trade (Krehbiel 1987). One
non-institutional explanation is deference. The floor recognizes the superiority and
the greater specialization of the committee. It has also been argued committees
trade votes among themselves. The line is: as long as the others vote for my most
electoral profitable policy, I will vote for theirs. But this is only one among many
other possible outcomes and one needs more than a plausible story.
This point deserves emphasis: the model misses a key element. There is no
explanation for the floor behavior.The floor has no rational basis to delegate power
to the committee.The point missing is related to problem identified with SIE.There
is a behavioral postulate missing. If the relation of the floor with the committee fol-
lows the standard noncooperative assumption, no such a delegation should happen.
Although this criticism was raised at the onset of the movement, it contributed lit-
tle to decrease the influence of the distributive approach3.
In this set up, the floor does not deliberate. Given the supposition that commit-
tees are composed by “preference-outliers” with homogeneous preferences, com-
mittees do not deliberate either.The decision making process is a mere aggregation
of pressures emanating from the districts.
The consequence of this type of committee power to the budget, as Shepsle and
Weingast (1984: 353) put it, is obvious: “there is a predisposition to increase spend-
ing”. Overspending –or an interventionist state-is accompanied by a greater atten-
tion to the district needs and a lesser attention to the national interest. In fact, given
the politicians’ objective and this institutional set up one can predict all sort of inef-
ficiencies in the programs congress approve. For instance, since a new program must
gain majority support, Congress will prefer programs that spread benefits across
many districts. The consequence for Shepsle and Weingast (1984 358) is that 
too little of the program is achieved relative to the amount of resources spent. In
some cases (such model cities), this transformation may be so complete that is not
clear whether the program’s objectives are achieved at all! 
Another inefficiency, according to the same authors, comes from the bias in favor
of programs that follow a political and not standard cost-benefit economic analysis.
This implies the possibility of divergence between the two criteria, the political and
the economic. In fact, one can reason that politicians will prefer programs that are
larger than the ones economists would choose. Economic costs may be transformed
into political benefits. The number of jobs created by a program provides a good
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example. Jobs are politically relevant inputs for politicians struggling for votes.
Over-contracting may bring more votes.The same logic applies for the search of the
suppliers of intermediaries products. Politicians will favor district suppliers, with no
regard to its efficiency. Examples could be multiplied.
As a pattern, public policy will take the classical distributive form. A distribu-
tive policy, to follow Fiorina and Noll (1978 256) definition, is one that 
is divisible into subactivities, each of which is evaluated and decided upon separately
and is beneficial to a relative small proportion of the electorate. Examples are federal
constructions projects, categorical grants, and commodity-specific tariffs.
The “electoral connection” imposes a political logic toward state expenditures.
Politicians favor distributive policies because those are the ones that provide the best
electoral return. For the constituency, the representative appears as the providers of
goods, services and programs. Of course, voters pay for these state services. But the
payment is diffused via the tax system that applies to all and, besides, is confusing.
Costs are spread. Benefits are concentrated.
The “conspiracy” between geographic (the districts characteristics) and the
jurisdictional committee control over policy areas tell us the whole history. We
know the structure of the incentives politicians have and we know institutions pose
almost no constrains on the ways their goals may be pursued.They hide the costs and
provide concentrated benefits for voters in their district. This “conspiracy” explains
policies after all “the method of producing some public goods or service, and con-
sequently the incidence of spending, is endogenous -it may be selected for its polit-
ical consequences” (Shepsle and Weingast 1984 356).
There are other conspiracies to consider.There is a “conspiracy” that matches the
committee with the bureaucratic agency. Politicians do not provide the benefits
themselves.They need the help of bureaucrats. For the bureaucrats, as we saw above,
the greater the bureaucracy, the better. Thus, there is space for politicians and
bureaucrats to collude around the level and type of services they provide for voters.
It is easy to see that they are in condition to choose services that are beneficial for
both. In short, as Fiorina and Noll (1978 257) argue 
Legislators and bureaucrats have an incentive to provide government services in 
an excessively bureaucratized manner. To do so raises the demand for facilitation
services (…) As the public bureaucracy grows larger, the importance of the
performance of facilitation will grow, and a legislator who is a good facilitator will 
be increasingly likely to be reelected. A challenger who is unproven as a facilitator 
is a riskier choice than an effective incumbent, and consequently provides a lower
expected payoff in this role4.
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There are too many versions of this argument. One may also take it from a dif-
ferent angle and include the “special interests” into the picture. The expressions
coined to grasp the essence of these descriptions are well known: “policy subsys-
tems”, “cozy triangles” “whirlpools”, “subgovernments”.The accent may change from
one approach to the other, but the thrust of the argument remains the same.
For the rational choice view, the first point to emphasize is that these actors -
politicians, bureaucrats and special interests—are in equilibrium. Morris Fiorina
(1989 122) makes the point clearly in the following passage:
Committee members enjoy the opportunity to exercise great influence in 
a particular area—given the pattern of committee assignments, often an area 
of considerable concern to their districts. The agency receives support from 
the committee. The clientele gains benefits from the program, and the circle 
closes when the clientele provides support for friendly committee members.
Heterogeneity of interests across districts and states underpins the system.
One congressman cares about federal water projects but not federal workers,
while another congressmen has the opposite concern. Both are politically better 
off if they implicitly trade for the right to exert disproportionate influence in 
the area of greater concern.
Note the choice of words. Fiorina does not say that voters receive the benefits
in the district. One may read clientele meaning voters or special interests. Special
interests may finance campaigns. Hence, the ambiguous term clientele: voters or spe-
cial interests are the same. According to widespread view, voters may be bought or
fooled by campaigns.
Hence, committees govern. The floor delegates to committees and committees
take full advantage of the delegation. In other words, the business of governing is
decentralized and fractionalized. There is no center capable of considering all the
consequences of the governmental action. Hence, state policies will lack coherence.
This is the problem with the American political system. Once more, Fiorina (1989
4) provides a good summary of this view:
There is a Washington establishment. In fact, it is a hydra with each head only
marginally concerned with the others’ existence. These establishments are not
malevolent, centrally directed conspiracies against the American people. Rather, they
are unconsciously evolved and evolving networks of congressmen, bureaucrats and
organized subgroups of the citizenry all seeking to achieve their own goals. Contrary
to what is popularly believed, the bureaucrats are not the problem. Congressmen 
are. The Congress is the key to the Washington establishment. The Congress created
the establishment, sustains it, and most likely will continue to sustain and even
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expand it. But I emphasize again that the disturbing aspects of the Washington
establishment follow from the uncoordinated operations of the overall system,
not from any sinister motivation of those who compose it.
There is a clear parallelism between the interpretation Fiorina puts forth in the
two passages I just quoted and the interpretation of the interest group pluralism
school, as for instance Theodore Lowi. Several other views reach similar conclu-
sions. One may wonder if other than the method, rational choice did offer a novel
interpretation of the working of the American political system. The contribution is
subtle but it does exist.To establish the contrast between these two accounts, I quote
a passage in which Lowi (1979 74) is describing agriculture programs:
Due to the special intimacy between federal agriculture programs and private
agriculture, each administrative organization becomes a potent political
instrumentality. Each of the self governing local units becomes one important point
in a definable political system which both administers a program and maintains the
autonomy of that program in face of all other political forces emanating from other
agriculture systems, from antagonistic farm and nonfarm interest, from Congress,
from the secretary, and from the president.
The politics of each of these self-governing programs is comprised of a triangular
pattern, with each other supporting the other two. The three points are: the
central agency, a congressional committee or subcommittee, and the local 
or district farm committees. The latter are also usually the grass-roots element 
of a national interest group.
Democratic government degenerates into the government of the few. Policy is
captured by special interests. Delegation of power from the center to the periphery
of the system is a common element in these arguments. The debate among these
interpretations revolves around the identity of the greater beneficiary: politicians,
bureaucrats or special interests.The identity of the great looser is not disputed: the
people. Hence, we have a variation of a classical theme. Democracy endogenously
degenerates into the government of minorities. The state does not act to promote
the interests of the people.
One of the distinctive features of the rational choice institutionalism is to argue
that politicians are the greater beneficiaries. At the origins of the movement, lies the
discovery of an empirical pattern: the vanishing of the marginal districts. After
World War II, reelection rates skyrocketed. Politicians, more specifically,
Representatives, are getting what they want. As Fiorina puts it: “Congress is the
problem”. Congress creates the Washington establishment and benefits from it.
Shepsle and Weingast (1984 : 366) assert that it should be so:
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Professional politicians possess ingenuity, an entrepreneurial spirit, and adaptability.
Legislative institutions and policies they foster reflect this central fact. Legislators,
motivated to secure reelection and legislative influence, devise institutions to further
these objectives.
In other words: rational politicians will always devise the institutions’ Mayhew
hypothetical planners would do: a committee system. Since some may not know
the passage —some readers may have other background than political science—
this is how Mayhew (1974: 81-2) explains the specific characteristics of the
American Congress 
The organization of Congress meets remarkably well the electorate needs of its
members. To put it another way, if a group of planners sat down and tried lo design 
a pair of American national assemblies with the goal of serving members’ electoral
needs year in and year out, they would be hard pressed lo improve on what exists.
Rational politicians are rational institutional planners. One could do no better.
To create a committee system with clear jurisdictional boundaries is the best way to
meet politicians’ objectives. But, note that this argument goes against institutional-
ism defined as a methodology. Institutions, if this is the case, do not constrain behav-
ior. Legislators build the institutions that best serve their needs.
As the most basic interest of the politicians –their concern with reelection—
explain institutional features and the policy outcome, rational choice approach dilutes
itself into a modified pluralism: politicians take the place of the special interests.
Besides, methodological individualism takes functionalist tones –after all, institutions
are explained by their consequences—a most ironic twist (See Krehbiel 1991).
Let me stress another specificity of the rational choice legislative studies
approach: Congress controls the bureaucracy, including the so-called independent
agencies.This is a point discussed at length by Terry Moe (1987). As argued by Moe,
Congressional dominance is demonstrated noting that committees control the budg-
et, exercise oversight through several devices, and control appointments (Moe 1987
478). There is no need to go any further. I will not present the models employed
and/or the fit of the theory with the facts. Moe has already done it and I could not
do a better job than him.What I want to emphasize is that is a specific position in a
larger debate. The bureaucracy does not control or have autonomy to set up poli-
cies. Agencies are creatures of the Congress5. The comparative field bought this
Congress centered version of the administrative state as if it were the unique one.
As a Congressional centered theory, this approach also reserves a secondary role
for the president. In fact, the president is a later comer to the formal modeling of the
American political system. For a long period, the legislative studies simply ignored the
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role played by the presidency. Her coming to the scene has been recent. Even now, the
role the president plays in formal model is a limited one.The presidential power is the
power to veto –or to threat with a veto. As Moe6 has noted, this reduces the power of
the president to a simple point in the space, a power that is not much different than
the one held by the filibuster senator. Clearly, there is something missing here.
This is a mostly ironic feature. For the comparative field, the choice of the form
of government and its consequences is the institutional debate. If institutions were
to matter, they should matter in this crucial and fundamental choice. In fact, as the
transition literature wanted, the debate over the effects of the forms of government
dominated the field. But as I argued above, neo institutionalism was badly equipped
to understand the role presidents play in separation of power systems. Not a good
start. I discuss this point in the next sections.
To sum up, the Legislative Studies Institutionalism has methodological and sub-
stantive features. On substantive terms, it may be read as an interpretation of the
way the American administrative state works. It is not a totally original contribu-
tion. It shares with other interpretations, the emphasis on the fragmentation of the
administrative state. American political system lacks a center that coordinates the
action of its parts. As Fiorina puts it: it is a hydra.
It also shares with others interpretation what one may call a populist tone. The
big looser is the people. But, legislative studies take the special interests, the presi-
dent and the bureaucracy out of the main picture. This is, I believe, peculiar to this
interpretation. Congress is taken as the center of American political system. The
administrative state – an excessively bureaucratized state—is a congressional crea-
ture. Hence, the greater beneficiary: the politicians that control Congress. These
specific tones have been adopted by the neo-institutional comparative literature.
This influence will be the subject of the next section. One may derive all that mat-
ters from politicians –in fact from Representatives— interests.
Before closing this section, I want to discuss the role that voters play in this
account. One may note that the view I reconstruct relies heavily on politicians’
shrewdness. They are able to design the institutions –including the internal organi-
zation of the Congress, the electoral laws and the bureaucracy—to serve their elec-
toral needs in a highly efficient way.Voters, as we saw, are the losers. But why would
voters let politicians –or the special interests, or the bureaucracy or even the pres-
ident—behave in this way? After all, aren’t voters the sovereign? 
Recall that Fiorina and Noll assume that voters are not different than bureau-
crats and politicians.They maximize their expected utility as much as the other rel-
evant actors do. Why would they vote for such politicians? Rational voters, one
could imagine, could do better than that.
Considerable ingenuity has been devoted to this point. Rational voters are at the
foundations of the democratic machinery.The result is not the one they would favor.
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The explanation provided by Fiorina and Noll (1987 257)7 is an ingenuous one:
The electoral process does not check this tendency because voters face a prisoner’s
dilemma in choosing among candidates. If voters disapprove of excessive
bureaucratization, electing a legislator who attacks bureaucratic inefficiency will 
be unlikely to alter the outcome of a majority-rule legislature, but will produce 
a less effective facilitator.
Alternative views have a more negative view of the electorate. For instance, in
some accounts voters are considered ignorant with the twist that it is rational to be
ignorant8. For others, they may be simply bought or convinced of anything via prop-
aganda. In this sense, Fiorina and Noll’s view is a benevolent one.They do not attrib-
ute to voters insufficiencies the distortion and the pathologies of democracy.Yet, this
does not seem to be a good explanation. It is clear that a group of politicians could
offer policies that would solve voters’ collective action problem. A group of politi-
cians offering these policies –say, a party—would win any election. Clever politicians
–and they are very clever on these accounts—would not miss this opportunity.
IV  FORMS OF GOVERNMENT
The form of government figures in the comparative literature as a kind of first prin-
ciple, i.e., as a variable from which everything that matters can be derived.The vari-
ation of the form of government has been associated with the probability of crises,
party discipline, economic growth, bureaucratic performance and so on so forth.
The argument is well known: the constitutional definition of the powers assigned to
the Executive and to the Legislative affect the strategies politicians will pursue.
More specifically, it affects the incentive politicians have to cooperate with one
another and, thus, with the government.
Under parliamentarism, members of the legislative body have incentives to
cooperate with the Executive. This is the essence of the fusion of the executive and
the legislative powers.The majority (but see below) of the legislature have their fate
associated with the fate of executive.Their mandates are linked to the survival of the
government. Under presidentialism, there are no incentives for cooperation.This is
a consequence of the very definition of a presidential system: the chief executive and
the legislators mandates are fixed and independent. Presidents do not have the
weapon Prime Ministers have, namely, to threaten to cut short what legislators care
the most: their mandates.
In this section, I review the basic arguments put forth in this debate. I show that
the characterization of the presidential system is highly dependent of the legislative
studies view of politics presented in the previous section. Politicians –I should say,
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legislators—basic interests drive all the argument. I note the logical inconsistency
of the contrast build on such basis. I also show that attempts to move beyond this
view have not been very successful. The problem in these cases is due to choice of
paradigmatic cases. Characteristics of the US political systems are taken as charac-
teristics of all presidential systems. That is, all presidential systems are treated as
coequal with the American system.The internal variation of presidential systems is
not taken into account. Conversely, the same type of reasoning is applied to
England and parliamentarism.
The contrast parliamentarism versus presidentialism is made considering that
any form of government faces a majoritarian imperative9. Without assembling a
majority in the legislature, any government, no matter its form, will not be able to
govern. If this is the case, if the government does not have the support of a majori-
ty, the political system is deadlocked, faces a governability crisis or you named it.
Parliamentarism, according to this view, is a regime in which the government,
in order to come to and stay in power, must enjoy the confidence of the legislature.
Since these are systems in which decisions are made according to majority rule, it
follows that no government that does not enjoy the support of a majority will exist
under parliamentarism. Minority governments could occasionally emerge, but these
would be relatively infrequent and necessarily ephemeral occurrences, which would
reflect the temporary inability of the current majority to crystalize.This inability is
temporary for the system contains automatic correctives for these situations: either
a new government supported by a majority will be formed or, if this is not possible,
new elections will be held so that such a majority may emerge.
Presidential regimes, in contrast, do not have a built-in mechanism to overcome
the majoritarian imperative.Voters, under presidentialism, have two agents who, by
design, do not necessarily represent the same majority. These agents have fixed
terms in office and do not depend on each other to exist. As a consequence, there is
nothing in the system that guarantees that the executive will enjoy the support of
the majority in the legislature. If this situation obtains, then the most likely out-
come, it is believed, is stalemate and impasse between the executive and the legisla-
tive, which can ultimately result in the collapse of the democratic regime.
There are, however, empirical reasons to doubt that one may distinguishes par-
liamentarism and presidentialism following this line of reasoning. In the first place,
as conclusively demonstrated by Strom (1990), it is not true that parliamentary gov-
ernments will necessarily produce majority governments, and most importantly, it
is not true that, when they do not, the minority governments that emerge should be
seen as a sign of crisis or of malfunction of the political system. Indeed, according
to his and other counts, about one-third of governments in parliamentary regimes
are formed even if they control less than 50% of the seats10. More importantly,
Strom’s analysis shows that minority governments are not a function of political
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instability or system malfunction. Rather, according to him, the emergence of
minority governments can be explained in terms of the calculus made by party lead-
ers about the costs and benefits of participating in government, given that they are
concerned not only with achieving office, but also with the policies that are to be
implemented by the government and the consequences of holding offices on the
next election. This calculus, Strom argues, is affected by the degree of policy influ-
ence parties can exert out of the government, as well as the competitiveness and
decisiveness of the electoral process11.
Note that Strom and others account of minority government take into account
governments supported by coalitions, that is, situations in which no party controls
the majority of seats.Thus, in multi party systems, minority governments are tanta-
mount to failure to form a majoritarian coalition. Hence, that means that there are
parties that could but do not hold portfolios. If the politicians’ strategies were
exclusively driven by their desire to hold office, then this should not happen. One
would always prefer to hold a portfolio over not holding one.Yet, as Strom argued,
parties may prefer to influence the policies the government chooses instead of gain-
ing the perks that comes with holding a portfolio.
Turning to presidentialism, there is evidence that minority presidents, although
frequent, are not as widespread as one would expect them to be. If we count presi-
dential and mixed regimes between 1946 and 1996, we find that in about 61% of
the years the party of the president did not control a majority of seats in Congress.
This rate is lower if we only consider pure presidential regimes (58%), particularly
in unicameral systems (48%)12.
Obviously, these cases, however, do not occur randomly. As one would expect,
the frequency with which the party of the president does not hold a majority in con-
gress increases markedly with the number of effective parties.That is to say, is high-
er when legislative elections are held under proportional representation systems.
But, more importantly, when they occur, minority presidents are not conducive to
the breakdown of the regime: presidential regimes are as likely to die when the pres-
ident controls less than 50% of the seats in congress as when they control more than
50% of the seats in congress.
As to deadlock, it is not the case that it is pervasive and that it is associated with
regime breakdown under presidentialism. Note, to begin with, that deadlock will
only occur when the preferences of a majority cannot prevail. These situations,
however, do not depend exclusively on the share of seats controlled by the party of
the president in congress. It also depends on whether the president has veto power;
on the type of congressional majority necessary to override the presidential veto;
on whether the system is unicameral or bicameral; and whether, in bicameral sys-
tems, veto override is by a vote in each chamber separately or in a joint session of
both chambers. When these factors are taken into consideration, one can, in fact,
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distinguish three situations: the situations in which either the president or the oppo-
sition “rules” and the situation in which deadlock may emerge. The latter will only
occur when the president is likely to veto a bill approved by a majority in the legis-
lature, but that majority is not sufficient to override the presidential veto. If the
president vetoes a bill and the opposition has enough votes to override the presi-
dential veto, then the opposition “rules.” If the president signs the bills that were
approved by his/her majority in congress, then the president “rules.”
Thus, once we consider both the political and the institutional conditions that
may generate deadlock, we find that the relationship between minority presidents
and deadlock situations is less than perfect and, most importantly, that presidential
regimes are not more likely to die when deadlock situations exist.
As to parliamentary regimes, the argument is that deadlock will never occur.
Indeed, parliamentary regimes are designed in such a way that whenever there is a
deadlock between the government and the legislature, either the government
changes or the legislature changes. Thus, although divided government may also
exist under parliamentarism (for example with minority governments), divided
government in parliamentarism cannot produce deadlock, at least not deadlock in
the same sense that we think of it under presidentialism.
Yet, the fact that under parliamentarism there is a mechanism that can be
invoked in the face of policy conflict between the government and the legislative
majority does not mean that this mechanism will always be invoked, or that, once
invoked, it will necessarily put an end to the disagreement that led to its use. In
other words, the existence of a mechanism for dealing with conflicts between the
government and the legislature does not mean that the conflict will be resolved
whenever it appears. For this reason, deadlock may also occur in parliamentary
regimes. It will probably assume a different form than deadlock in presidential
regimes, but it will nonetheless be present.
One interesting case is suggested by Denmark.The post-1973 period witnessed
the emergence of a curious norm regarding executive-legislative relations, which
entirely violates what we would expect to see happening under a parliamentary
form of government. Before 1973, as Damgaard (1944) demonstrates, governments
expected parliament to pass proposals it introduced and not to pass proposals that
the government did not want to see passed. Opposition parties would not insist on
a vote that would mean a government defeat, unless, of course, “the purpose was
actually to defeat the government” (p.31). In line with the “norms of parliamen-
tarism,” a government defeat on a vote of some importance would lead either to res-
ignation or to new elections. After 1973, however, but in particular in the 1980s,
“the government accepted numerous defeats in more or less important matters
without resigning or calling elections.” (p.32). Thus, during the “fourleaf-clover”
governments of 1982-88, “the government lost every twelfth final division” (p.33):
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of 1356 votes taken during this period, the government lost 108 and in 105 of them
“it decided to accept the defeat without applying sanctions in order to stay in office”
(p.34).13 Hence, it is not at all clear that parliamentarism guarantees an automatic
resolution to disagreements between the executive and the legislative.
Another significant illustration is provided by Greece, where it took three elec-
tions and five governments in the short space of 10 months to resolve the impasse
that had emerged during the government of Andreas Papandreou. The solution that
eventually emerged was itself not perfect: the government that emerged from the
April 8, 1990 election headed by the New Democracy party controlled exactly 50%
plus one seats in parliament; this government became possible only after the exter-
nal support of the one member of the center-right Democratic Renewal was secured.
It is clear, therefore, that the built-in mechanism available in parliamentarism for the
resolution of impasses may fail depending on whether the conflict is a reflection of
the distribution of preferences in the population and on the current elite’s reaction
to these preferences.14 The point to be emphasized, thus, is that, although at any
given point in time parliamentary institutions seem to contain the solution to a dead-
lock situation, there is nothing that guarantees that a solution will be found.
As a matter of fact, one of the traditional arguments in favor of presidentialism
emphasizes precisely the point that parliamentary regimes do not guarantee that
there will always be a government (Sartori 1994). Parliamentary regimes will pro-
duce stable governments only when some additional political conditions obtain
(such as a non-fragmented party system, composed of disciplined parties).
Presidentialism, in turn, would be able to produce a government even under very
adverse political conditions.
But, so far, one possibility has not been considered, namely that a minority
president may count with the support of a party coalition in the Legislature.When
no party holds a majority in a parliamentary multi-party regime, the most common
outcome is a government backed by coalition. Presidents, the usual argument goes,
can rely only on his own party. Coalitional government does not seem to be a fea-
sible alternative.
As an empirical matter, coalition governments are not at all foreign to presi-
dential regimes.The most complete study of this topic is the one produce by Deheza
(1997) who considered governments in 9 South American presidential democracies
between 1958 and 1994. She found that, of 123 governments observed during this
period,15 she finds that 69 (56%) are coalition governments, of which 24 are minor-
ity coalition governments. She also finds that a significant share of coalition govern-
ments is formed after the election. There were 59 governments formed as a conse-
quence of presidential elections; of these, 30.5% were coalition governments based
on pre-electoral agreements. Of the remaining 41 governments, 17 (41%) were
post-electoral coalition governments.16
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The question that one must ask, of course, is the one about what keeps the coali-
tion together in presidential regimes. In parliamentary regimes, the often cited
mechanism that should be sufficient to keep coalitions together is inherent to the
regime: the risk that governments will fall if a coalition member defects.This mech-
anism is obviously absent under presidentialism, and hence parties will face no costs
of defecting from coalitions. Although this is obviously a difference between the two
regimes, it does not follow that it is sufficient to induce coalition behavior in them.
That this behavior is considerably more complicated can be seen from the following
hypothetical examples.
Imagine, in the first place, a country with a parliamentary system in which elec-
tions are held and no party obtains a majority of seats in the legislature. As a result
a (minimum winning) coalition government is formed. A few months into the term
some exogenous crisis hits the country and the government is required to imple-
ment measures that go against the positions of one of the coalition partners. This
party’s decision about what to do will depend on which of the two alternatives is
less costly to it. It can choose to support the government against its own positions
at the cost of promoting a policy that is not its preferred policy and perhaps at some
electoral costs in the future. Or it can choose to vote against the government, thus
blocking the implementation of policies that it does not like, but paying the cost of
facing another election and eventually staying out of office. One can see that the
party will choose to support the government only if the costs of anticipated elec-
tions are higher than the inherent and future electoral costs of deviating from its pol-
icy preferences.There is no reason to suppose that this will always be true. But this
is what we have to suppose to believe that parliamentary regimes will necessarily
induce coalition governments.
Now imagine a similar situation under presidentialism. Faced with the choice of
supporting policies that it does not like, that party does not have to consider the cost
of anticipated elections. But it still has to consider the costs of promoting a policy
that is not its preferred policy, the eventual electoral costs of this decision, and the
certain costs of being out of office. Again, there is no reason to suppose that these
costs will be necessarily smaller than the costs of remaining in power and support-
ing the government. But this is what we have to do in order to believe that presi-
dential regimes will necessarily lack inducements for coalition participation.
Thus, the view that under presidentialism legislators and parties lack incentives
to cooperate with the government depends not so much on the fact that this is a sys-
tem of separation of powers, but on the assumption that all that the actors care
about is to come to and stay in office. As I have shown above, if one applies this
assumption to parliamentary regimes, one cannot explain, among other occur-
rences, minority governments. So, nowadays, models of government formation
under parliamentarism (see for instance, Austen-Smith and Banks 1988) assume that
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voters care for policies as well as for offices. If we hold the same behavioral assump-
tion for presidentislism, then one is forced to conclude that minority presidents are
not doomed to fail. If politicians under presidentialism care about policies than they
may opt to cooperate with the president. Presidents can form coalitions and govern
with its support.
In fact, Przeworski, Cheibub and Saiegh (2002) have show that standard game-
theoretical model of government formation under parliamentarism, the one pro-
posed by Austen Smith and Banks (1988), can be accommodated to the presiden-
tial institutional set up. The authors show that substantive results do not depend
heavily on the form of government. That is to say, if one follows Diermeier and
Krehbiel advice, that is, if the behavioral assumptions are kept constant while the
institutional set up, and only the institutional set up varies, then the alleged dif-
ferences between the two forms of government disappear. When one gets differ-
ences, it is because the behavioral assumptions vary with the institutions. In the
case of the incentives for cooperation, one usually assumes that politicians care
exclusively about office in presidential regime and about office and policy in par-
liamentary regimes.
I could go on. Party discipline would be an obvious issue to tackle now. It is
common to argue that disciplined parties are foreign to presidentialism and a nec-
essary feature of parliamentarism. The structure of the argument depends on the
absence(presence) of incentives for cooperation in presidential(parliamentary)
regimes. So there is no need to go over all these arguments. The objection parallels
the one made above. Empirically, the claim is also false. Just consider Venezuela
before Chávez and Italy and France Fourth Republic.There are disciplined parties in
presidential regimes and non disciplined on parliamentary.
The strategies of the relevant actors, above all politicians, are constrained by
several other institutional features. In a sense, forms of government is too macro and
general to define strategies. Actually, comparativists do not work at this general
level. They do fill in the details and, most often, they derive these consequences
from the institutional details of the cases they know better. In fact, to take the
United States and England as the paradigmatic cases of presidentalism and parli-
manetarism is a common practice in the field.
More than that, one tends to confound traits of the American political system
with its form of government, and, to do the same with England.
This is clearly the case, just to illustrate my point, of the frequently cited paper
by Moe and Caldwell (1994). The authors pose the following question:
Take bureaucracy.Would a parliamentary system tend to generate a bureaucracy 
that is markedly different –in strucuture, performance, accountability—from what 
we should find under separation of power? (172) 
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The authors provide a positive answer. Bureaucracies differ as a consequence of
the form of government. Besides posing the question in such a general terms, Moe
and Caldwell explicitly attempt to base their answer in a deductive mode. The dif-
ference follows from the very principle that distinguishes the two forms of govern-
ments. As they (1994 172) put it 
When a nations choose a presidential or a parliamentary from, they are choosing 
a whole system, whose various properties arise endogenously –whether they like it 
or not—out of the political dynamics that their adopted form sets in motion. Attractive
structures of government may be impossible to achieve, unattractive ones impossible
to avoid. Presidential and parliamentary systems come with their own baggage. They
are package deals.
But, when comes to derive what each system puts in motion, the authors basi-
cally describe two cases: the United States and Britain. With regard parliamen-
tarism, they explicitly inform the reader that they will concentrate on the “classic
Westminster case” (177).As of presidentialism, the picture is even worse, since their
commentaries is not preceded by a similar restrictive warning.
Being schematic, their conclusion is that bureaucracies are less effective under
presidentialism than under parliamentarism. But, the conclusion is not derived from
characteristics that define these forms of government. In the case of parliamen-
tarism, their argument relies heavily on characteristics of the British system that are
not necessarily found in all parliamentary systems: a two party system, highly cohe-
sive parties and “unchecked authority”. On their account, this is a system with real
power alternation and in which is easy to change the status-quo. Hence, the conclu-
sion: “Agencies and programs cannot be insulated from opponents and future
authorities by embedding an intricate ex ante control strucuture in the law” (177).
It may be true that given a Westminster system, all these consequences follow. But
the Westminster system is not the only form of a parliamentary system. The crucial
features from which the bureaucratic characteristics are derived –power alternation
and absence of a Constitution—do not define parliamentarism.
The same is true for their argument about the bureaucratic structure under pres-
identialism.Their argument is based upon the conflict between the executive and the
legislative and the way each Power tries to shape the organization of the government.
Key for their argument is that both act independently and with different objectives
on that matter. Congress colludes with interest groups whereas presidents act uni-
laterally. Interest group want agencies that do not work since they fear the State and
the possibility that an adversary interest group captures the bureaucracy. Hence, they
design bureaucratic institutions that do not work. The president wants the agencies
that Prime Minister can get, but all he can do is to add a new layer of agencies over
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the ones Congress and groups have already created. Thus, although presidents are
“the only champion of effective, responsible government”, their efforts and initia-
tives end up contributing to “create still more bureaucracy and heighten complexi-
ties and internal contradictions of the American administrative system” (176) 
The conflict over the control of the bureaucracy is not a necessarily feature of
the separation of power systems. Not all presidentialisms are like the American.
Separation of power does not necessarily imply that Congress and the President will
dispute the control over the bureaucracy.
Moe and Caldwell are not alone on trying to relate forms of government and
bureaucratic performance. Other attempts incur in the same mistake: to confound
features of the US and of the British system as if they were necessary aspects of the
forms of government they adopt. For instance, Ackerman (2000 695) argues that
parliamentary regimes foster functional specialization: a bureaucracy that knows
that it will have to serve different masters along the road will want to “cultivate a
reputation for neutral competence.Whatever goals have been established by the cab-
inet, the senior civil servant stands ready ad eager to implement them.” The prem-
ise of the argument is that the “PM and her cabinet ministers have their eyes firmly
fixed on the next elections. If they loose, then the fate of all their precious legisla-
tive initiatives is at mercy of their political opponents. As a consequence, they want
knowledgeable and effective implementation from the bureaucracy, and they want it
fast”. (695). In this world, bureaucrats have to prove that they can provide the solu-
tions both sides want fast. Hence they don not take sides, they are neutral and want
to prove their competence. That would make them more valuable.
Again, a two party system with clear-cut rotation and in which the status quo
can be changed at the majority’s will with few constrains are not characteristics of
the parliamentary system. In Italy and Japan, one party controlled the government
for forty years or so. Even in England, rotation in power has not been as fast as
assumed by the argument.The conservatives held power for fifteen years or so, and
the Labour has been in power for almost ten years. In fact, this tantamount to hold
constant the variables Strom (1990) invokes to explain minority governments: the
competitiveness and decisiveness of the electoral process. Besides, under coalition-
al government, the standard argument goes, voters do not know which party should
be held responsible for government performance.
The critical assessment of the American bureaucracy Ackerman offer does not
extend to all separation of power system. American bureaucracy, according to
Ackerman, is highly politicized. Ackerman agrees with Moe and Caldwell, the
politicization of the bureaucracy has its roots in the struggle between the executive
and the congress over its control. The difficulties to change legislation contribute
to create an autonomous bureaucracy. Again, these are not features of all separation
of power systems.
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Actually, Ackerman initiate his discussion of this topic noting what is peculiar of
the United States scenario:
At the time they were writing the Constitution in 1787, the Founders did not have
the slightest idea that the American government would one day employ millions 
of officials exercising a bewildering variety of functions” (688).
Hence, a bureaucratic or administrative state was not part of the original
Constitutional design. The executive-legislative struggle over the control of the
bureaucracy is a consequence of this constitutional silence. Hence, most of the bad
characteristics of the American bureaucracy Ackerman attributes to the separation
of power systems are, in fact, specific to the US. They follow from the incomplete-
ness of the American constitution. I take this issue in the concluding section.
To sum up, there are few, solid, and consequential outcomes one may derive
from the choice of the form of government. The usual arguments found in this
extensive literature violate the essence of the neo-institutionalism as a method:
behavioral assumptions vary with the institutional set up, so that the divergence in
outcomes are not derived from the institutional set up, but from the implicitly
assumed variation on behavior. The second usual mistake is to fill blank spaces with
country specific traits. This is also a problem with institutionalism since it indicates
that strategies cannot be derived from macro institutions.There are too many strate-
gies to follow under equilibrium. The result is indeterminacy.
V  PRESIDENTIALISM AND BUREAUCRATIC AGENCIES
Recent scholarly work has emphasized that the American president is much more
powerful than the constitutional text indicates (Moe and Howell 1989, Mayer
2000, Mayer 2002, Howell 2003). Political scientists have recently discovered the
importance of presidential unilateral power, expressed mainly by the issuing of
Executive Orders.
Following the arguments put forth by West and Cooper (1989 581), one may
note that a new phase of the presidential power aggrandizement is under way. The
authors argue that the recent American administrative process is an arena for com-
petition between the President and Congress. According to these authors view,
recent Supreme Court decisions have favored the Executive at the expenses of the
Legislative with important “implications both for the character of policy making
and for the distribution of power within our political system.” West and Cooper
argue that a new paradigm of bureaucratic control has emerged, one that “advocates
centralized presidential control over the agency policy making while prescribing a
passive role for Congress”
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West and Cooper (1989 586) relate the emergence of this new paradigm with
the characterization of the American political system as fragmented and lacking
coordination. In the authors words 
The new model of political oversight has been a natural response to conventional 
view about the effects of delegated authority. The exercise of broad discretion 
by administrative agencies has obviously been difficult to reconcile with the tenets 
of representative democracy and separation of powers. Beyond this, it has been
frequently identified as a source of malaise in the policy-making process.
The new paradigm is a response to this malaise, to the
equation of delegated authority with a fragmented policy-making system that 
is inherently unaccountable and uncoordinated. The popularity of the prescription 
for centralized presidential control over the administrative process is quite
understandable given the pervasiveness of such indictments.
Hence, as legislative studies made its way to comparative politics, popularizing
one particular view of the conventional wisdom, the American political system
entered a new phase. A phase in which the balance of power tilted in the presiden-
tial direction. To centralize the policy-making process in the presidential hands,
since at least the Reagan presidency and the issuing of the Executive Orders 12291
and 12498, is the current trend.The Supreme Court has supported this trend in key
decisions. As I noted previously, the president has been the omitted actor in formal
models of politics.
That has important consequences for the comparative analysis of separation of
power systems. In constitutional terms, American presidents are weak. Presidents,
by the very definition of presidential system (see Shugart and Carey 1992), hold leg-
islative powers. The American presidents legislative power is confined to a reactive
legislative power. More than that, the American president is confined to the weak-
est form of veto power: the package veto. Most presidents have active legislative
powers, as the exclusive prerogative to initiate legislation in certain areas, control
over the introduction and execution of the budget, and last but not least, decree
power. Hence, most presidents are powerful than the American.
Hence, Tsebelis (1995 325) is wrong when he asserts that 
In parliamentary systems the executive (government) controls the agenda, and 
the legislature (parliament) accepts or rejects proposals, while in presidential
systems the legislature makes the proposal and the executive (the president) signs
or vetoes then.
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The relation between Executive and Legislative varies with the legislative pow-
ers the Constitution assigns to the president17. Few presidents in existing systems
cannot initiate legislation. Not only are presidents often endowed with the capaci-
ty to initiate legislation; often they also have the exclusive right to initiate legisla-
tion in some areas (such as appropriation and budgetary matters), whereas legisla-
tors are restricted in their capacity to amend bills in these areas. Hence, contrary
to Tsebelis (1995), presidents can do much more than simply sign or veto bills pro-
posed by the legislative.
In addition, some presidents also have decree-power; they are constitutionally
able to unilaterally alter the status quo. Even though there is considerable variation
in the specifics of presidential decree-power (Carey & Shugart 1998), often presi-
dential decrees enter into effect first (whether immediately or not) and the legisla-
ture acts second.The legislature acts a posteriori, rejecting, amending or accepting
the new status-quo brought about by the executive decree.18 Given decree-power,
therefore, a president can dictate the legislative agenda by forcing the legislature to
make a decision on some matter it could, otherwise, not have appreciated.Thus, no
group in the legislature, not even the majority, can “close the gates” for a presiden-
tial initiative made by decree.
Note that the power to impose an agenda does not imply that presidents will
always prevail against the will of the majority. In fact, as Huber (1996) shows, since
a legislative majority can always reject a presidential decree, a model of executive-
legislative conflict is unable to explain why the executive would ever make use of
decrees. There are, of course, strategic advantages that the agenda setter may
explore. But as Krehbiel (1988 270) has argued, these are not properly anti-majori-
tarian devices.19
In addition, the government’s legislative and agenda powers, among which
decree-power, need not be interpreted as means for solving “vertical” conflicts, that
is, conflicts between the government and the opposition. Rather, as argued by
Huber (1996), the government’s legislative powers are also means for solving “hor-
izontal” conflicts, that is, conflicts between the government and its supporters. In
this sense, these are ways that the government has to protect the cohesion of its
coalition against the opportunistic behavior of its members.20
It follows from this that, because of presidents’ legislative powers, separation of
powers in presidential regimes is not as complete as it is usually considered to be.
Presidential legislative powers are commonly interpreted in the context of the US
constitution, that is, as means to create checks and balances. But, as we just have
seen, the legislative powers of the executive are not only a mechanism for checking
the power of the majority or imposing the will of the president. They are also
weapons of the majority. Therefore, the fusion of executive and legislative powers
is not absent from presidential systems.
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Note that this interpretation is at odds with Shugart & Carey`s (1992) view
according to which presidential systems that endow presidents with considerable
legislative powers —what they call strong presidents —have greater probability of
experimenting a breakdown. They argue that strong presidents will have smaller
incentives to negotiate with congress and, thus, paralysis and crisis are more likely.
This is so because strong presidents have the institutional means to impose their will
on congress; weak presidents, in turn, know that they have no other alternative than
to negotiate. This argument, however, is based on the “vertical conflict” model and
disregards the possibility that the president will try to organize a majority in con-
gress. But once the possibility that the president and the majority have overlapping
preferences is considered, then legislative agenda powers need not imply paralysis,
crisis and eventual breakdown.
The organization of congress and the degree of control the executive has over
the legislative agenda does influence the behavior of individual legislators. They act
in a constrained environment. If they want to influence policy, they have to do so
according to the rules of procedure of the body they belong to, and in the terms set
by the president. Thus, for example, the incentives to cultivate the personal vote
that stem from the electoral arena may be entirely neutralized in the legislature
though a distribution of legislative rights that favors the executive. For this reason,
we cannot deduce, as it is commonly done, the behavior of legislators from electoral
and party legislation alone.
In this context, the case of Brazil is of central theoretical interest for it provides
an example of the far reaching effects of the centralization of the decision making
process. The system produced by the 1988 constitution is frequently cited as the
example of bad institutional design (Ames 2001). All of the institutional choices that
should not be made, it seems, were made in 1988: a strong presidential regime (one
of the strongest in the world according to Shugart & Carey’s 1992 155 rank); pro-
portional representation formula for legislative elections with high district magni-
tude; very permissive party and electoral legislation (e.g., open-list and low party
control over access to the ballot). In such a system, the party system is bound to be
fragmented and presidents can be virtually certain that their party will not control
a majority of seats in both legislative houses. And even if they did, parties would be
highly undisciplined thus making the majority status of the president a mere for-
mality (Sartori, 1994 113; Mainwaring 1991). Hence, to have their agenda
approved, presidents would use their strong legislative powers, which would lead to
conflict and paralysis.To paraphrase Sartori (1997), the system created in 1988 was
nothing but hopeless.
Yet, the performance of the post-1988 Brazilian regime is completely at odds
with what we would expect to find on the basis of this institutional analysis.
Brazilian presidents of this period have had great success enacting their legislative
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agenda. Presidents introduced 86% of the bills enacted since 1988 and the rate of
approval of the bills introduced by the executive was 78%. Presidents have formed
coalitions to govern, and have been able to reliably obtain the support of the par-
ties that belong to the government coalition in approving its legislation: the aver-
age discipline of the presidential coalition, defined as the act of voting in accor-
dance with the public recommendation of the government leader in the floor, was
85.6%. This support is sufficient to make a presidential defeat in a roll call a con-
siderably rare event. Thus, despite the “centrifugal” characteristics of Brazilian
presidentialism, as indicated by the party and electoral legislation, presidents have
been able to govern relying on the support of a disciplined coalition (Figueiredo &
Limongi 2000).
This outcome is a result of both the way the Brazilian congress is organized and
the president’s ability to control the legislative agenda. The Brazilian congress is
highly centralized. Legislative rights heavily favor party leaders, who are taken to
be perfect agents of their caucuses (bancadas) when it comes to most procedural
decisions (such as the request for roll-call votes, the closing of debates and, most
importantly, the designation of a bill as urgent for purposes of appreciation). The
urgency request is a kind of “discharge petition:” it removes the bill from the com-
mittee and forces its immediate (24 hours) deliberation by the floor. Bills that are
appreciated as urgent cannot be freely amended: only amendments signed by 20%
of the lower house are accepted, which implies that only those amendments sup-
ported by party leaders will be considered. As Figueiredo & Limongi (2000:157)
have shown, the approval of the urgency petition, in turn, is highly associated with
the success of a bill. Centralization, thus, deprives members of congress of the leg-
islative rights they need to control in order to influence legislation.
The Brazilian presidents, thanks to their constitutional legislative powers, have
a direct influence on the definition of the legislative agenda. Using its decree-
power, the executive places on the agenda what it deems to be the most relevant
and pressing issues. The president can also influence the pace of ordinary legisla-
tion by requesting urgency for the appreciation of specific bills (which will give
each house 45 days to deliberate on them). The president has also the exclusive
right to initiate legislation related to the definition of the budget, taxation and pub-
lic administration.Therefore, the executive monopolizes the legislative initiative on
the most crucial areas of policy-making.
Hence, it is via the participation in the government that individual legislators
will obtain access to resources they need for political survival: policy influence and
patronage. Leaders bargain with the executive: they exchange political support
(votes) for access to policy influence and patronage. The executive, thus, provides
party leaders with the means to punish backbenchers who do not follow the party
line: their share of patronage may be denied. The executive, in turn, given the
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resources it controls, is in a very advantageous position. Party leaders become, in
fact, the main brokers in the bargaining between the executive and the legislators.
Contrary to what is currently assumed about Brazil, presidents do not need to bar-
gain on a case-by-case basis. They are in a position to demand support for their
entire legislative agenda. Once the government is formed and benefits are distrib-
uted among the members of the coalition, the president, with the help of party
leaders, may threaten representatives and actually punish those who do not follow
the party line. Hence, to say it once more, the actual pattern of legislative-execu-
tive relation in Brazil’s presidential regime is rather different from what one would
expect to find if we were to deduce it from its electoral and partisan legislation.
It should be clear by now that separation of powers does not necessarily imply
decentralized decision-making. Institutional analyses that stress the negative effects
of separation of powers, and that point to specific, often restrictive, electoral laws
as a corrective to these effects, entirely miss the point. Presidentialism does not
necessarily imply, or require, decentralized decision-making and conflict between
the executive and the legislative. Once one assumes the possibility that coalition
governments may also exist in presidential regimes, the degree of overlapping
between the executive and legislative majorities has to be adjusted.
Presidential control over the agenda becomes a weapon to be used by the
majority and not against the majority. We can see, thus, that presidents are not
necessarily as distinct from prime minister as it is normally assumed. As we
showed above, outcomes that are usually associated exclusively with parliamen-
tarism, such as executive success and dominance over the legislative output
obtained through disciplined parties, can be found even in “hopeless” presidential
regimes such as Brazil’s.21
Brazil and the United States are both presidential systems. Yet, they are radi-
cally different systems. The conventional wisdom in the comparative field, for the
reasons I tried to spell out on previous sections, tend to equate both systems.
Moreover, comparative institutionalism is badly equipped to understand the role of
the president in the Brazilian system.
The Brazilian and the American independent agencies have been created in dif-
ferent contexts. Although discussing the European case, Majone (1997 1) account
explains the origins of regulatory agencies in Brazil. According to this author,
Since the late seventies, European governments have been forced to change their
traditional modes of governance in response to such trends as increasing international
competition and deepening economic and monetary integration within the European
Union. Strategic adaptation to the new realities has resulted in a reduced role for 
the positive state and a corresponding increase in the role of the regulatory state:
rule making instead of taxing and spending.
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One just needs to adapt the quotation. First correct the date: the change took
place later in Brazil. Mid to late nineties is the correct date.The question then is to
explain why Brazil was a latecomer to this process. Second, monetary integration
was not related to European Union but it was a factor.What remains to be explained
are the consequences of these changes in the mode of governance.This a whole new
research agenda that intend to embrace in the near future.
VI  CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE LIMITS OF INSTITUTIONALISM.
The variables chosen by comparativists are too macro to have such a precise
influence over the strategies of all the relevant actors. Institutions do matter. They
do constrain the set strategies political actors pursue. But, there are more institu-
tions than forms of the government and electoral laws that do matter. Besides, insti-
tutions do interact with one another and there is much that is left to be determined
along the way. Besides, we will not be sure that we have specified all the relevant
strategies available to the actor. One cannot define these strategies looking exclu-
sively to the form of government. Other institutions, most of them country specif-
ic, will also matter. Moreover, path dependence will also play a role since there are
different possible answers to non-specified contingencies.
One aspect of these observations, what transaction-cost analysis refers to as the
incompleteness of contracts, is of special interest. It questions the basis of institu-
tionalism as a method. Constitutions and statutes, like contracts, cannot specify
every possible contingency. Hence, strategies may not be precisely defined ex ante.
Avinash Dixit (1998 20) observation is a good point to start:
If constitutions are contracts, they are very incomplete ones.They do not spell out 
the rules and procedures to be followed in every conceivable instance in precise detail.
They leave much to be interpreted and determined in specific future eventualities 
The point is related to Ackerman observation about the American constitution
quoted at the end of the fourth section. The American constitution precedes the
advent of the administrative state. Besides, as Moe and Howell (1999 850) note 
The Constitution sets out the entire design of American government in just a few brief
pages and almost entire lacking in detail. (…) The actual power of the three branches,
then, both in absolute sense and relative to one another, cannot be determined from
the Constitution alone.They must of necessity, be determined in the ongoing practices
of politics. And this ensures that the branches will do more than struggle over day-to-day
policy making.They will also engage in a higher order struggle over the allocation of
power and the practical rights to exercise it.
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Hence, the different branches of the government fight to control what contract
analysis calls the residual power. Each branch fights to incorporate as its duty what
is left ambiguous by the Constitutional text. Note that a successful claim over the
non-specified part of the institutional contract may lead to a new layer of institu-
tional power. A successful claim over the residuum may lead to its institutionaliza-
tion.
Of course, this is not true only for the American constitution. This happens
everywhere. Bagehot’s account of the English constitution, of its transformation, is
an assessment of how profound such changes may be.
Clearly, this defies comparative analysis based upon macro variables as form of
the government, electoral laws and so on so forth. Within each of these groups,
there may be too much variation. It follows that one may not be able to specify com-
mon strategies and, thus, derive outcomes. In these terms, institutionalism as a
method may be condemned to failure.
NOTES 
1 Basically, that all actors have single peaked preferences. Note that this is not an assumption about individ-
uals, but about the collectivity given individual preferences must be related in a precise way.
2 I intend to develop this section. I want to discuss that for noncooperative game theory, one does not sim-
ply aggregate preferences. Beliefs about strategies are endogenously generated. Hence, there is space for delibera-
tion in game theoretic models. Besides, recent developments in economy theory, the so called transaction costs
analysis, indicates that contracts cannot specify all contingencies. That limits the reach of institutionalism as a
methodology.
3 See Ferejohn 1986 for thoughtful discussion of the complexities involved. Shepsle and Weingast (1987)
failed in their attempt to model “the institutional foundations of the committee power”. The proposed model has
noncooperative tone but it did not survive Krehbiel’s (1987) criticism.
4 I will cite the omitted passage below.
5 In this account, policies are not set by special interests either. Hence this view differs from the one pro-
posed by the Chicago School. The latter is a capture explanation: capture of the agencies by the special interests. The
regulated industries use the power of the state to extract benefits. As Moe notes, the Chicago School does not model
institutions. They are incorporated as black boxes to indicate that they do not matter. The bureaucracy also does not
play any real role either.
6 I can’t find where.
7 This is the omitted part in the quoted passage above.
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8 This is the case of Becker (1983). He argues that voters face high costs to get political information. These
costs exceed the returns they can obtain via their vote. Thus, it is rational to be politically ignorant.
9 This section relies on Cheibub and Limongi 2002.
10 See Strom (1990:8-9) for a summary of findings. See also Laver and Schofield (1998:70) and Cheibub (1988).
11 See also Laver and Schofield (1998) for a discussion of minority governments in European parliamentary
regimes and for an argument for the inappropriateness of the “majoritarian imperative” for the analysis of these systems.
12 These numbers are drawn from Cheibub 1988.
13 The factors that led to this transformation are complex and are beyond the scope of this paper. It is suffi-
cient to say here that a central factor is the fragmentation of the party system that resulted from the December 1973
election. In that election, the four traditional parties that had dominated Danish politics since the early 1900s
(Conservatives, Liberals, Radical Liberals and Social Democrats) obtained about 60% of the seats, down from over
90% in the previous parliament. Three parties obtained representation for the first time (Progress Party, Christian
People’s Party, and Center Democrats), and two parties (Communists and the Justice Party) obtained seats for the
first time since 1957. Overall, the new parliament had 10 parties, twice as many as it had prior to the elections. The
pattern of government formation that resulted was also different. Whereas no single party majority government has
ever been formed since 1945, prior to 1973 half of the governments were single party minority governments, and
another 40% were majority coalition governments. After 1973, however, no majority government has been formed
and 55% of the governments were coalition governments.
14 The electoral reform approved prior to the June 18, 1989 election, the first in the series of three, did make
the government formation process more complex by increasing the degree of proportionality in the system and thus
favoring smaller parties. According to analysts, this reform “was widely seen as designed to reduce the likelihood of
New Democracy forming a one-party government after the June election” (Keesing Contemporary Archives, on-line,
volume 35, March 1989).
15 Governments are marked by the change of the President, by the change in the partisan composition of the
government, or by changes in the share of seats held by governments parties in congress due to legislative elections.
We find that the third criterion is problematic since it implies that no government survives a legislative election.
Unfortunately it is not possible to distinguish from the published numbers by how much this inflates the counting.
16 Studies of coalition government under presidentialism are still few. Other references include Amorin Neto
(1998), Foweraker (1998) and Altman-Olin (1999).
17 This and the next paragraphs rely heavily on Cheibub and Limongi 2002.
18 Note that often rejection of a presidential decree does not mean a return to the status quo ante. Even if
there is a majority in favor of the status quo, once the decree has been in effect, rejecting it may have become an
unattractive or unavailable alternative.
19 It is true that, since it immediately alters the status quo, the decree power will increase the power of the
agenda setter.When legislatures have to vote on ordinary propositions, legislators compare the status quo (SQ) with
the situation to be created by the proposition. In the case of an executive decree, the legislator compares the situa-
tion created by the decree (D) with the new situation created by rejecting a decree that has been in effect for some
time (SQD). If the preferences of the majority are SQ>D>SQD, then the majority will approve the decree. If the
preferences of the majority are SQD>D (assuming that SQ is no longer a viable alternative), then the majority will
reject the decree.
20 It is interesting to note here that there seems to be no association between minority status and the use of
decree-power (Figueiredo & Limongi 1998).
21 Now, if presidential regimes are not all alike, neither are parliamentary systems. That the government will
control the legislative agenda does not follow from the definition of parliamentarism. Neither is it necessary that the
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legislative rights of private members be curtailed in parliamentary regimes. Committees may have considerable pow-
ers in parliamentary assemblies and may erect barriers to the executive agenda.
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